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A
n unprecedented eleven-
member  UK Supreme 
Court (‘UKSC’) decided 
Miller – supposedly the 
constitutional case of the century – 
on 24 January 2017. As had been 
generally predicted, the government’s 
argument, that it could start the process 
of withdrawing from the EU using a 
prerogative power instead of an Act of 
Parliament, was roundly rejected by an 
8:3 majority. 
The Miller  case wil l  no doubt be 
discussed for years to come. The 
government’s unconstitutional attempt 
to bypass Parliament was thwarted by 
confident and convincing reasoning in 
a single judgement signed by eight SC 
Justices.
Beyond the headline-grabbing defeat 
and the subsequent focus on statutory 
author isat ion in the form of the 
European Union (Notification of 
Withdrawal) Bill, the government 
also secured a strong victory on the 
question whether it needed the consent 
from the devolved legislatures (Scotland, 
Northern Ireland, and Wales) before 
the invoking Art 50 TEU. The UKSC 
unanimously held that such consent 
was not required. The UKSC had already 
required parliamentary legislation in 
relation to the first question, which 
took some of the heat out of the second 
question. Yet the government’s victory 
on the devolution question is likely to 
be short-lived.
Since the referendum in June 2016, the 
government’s official policy towards 
the regions has been inclusive. In his 
statement to Parliament on Brexit on 27 
June 2016, PM David Cameron said 
that: ‘we must ensure that the interests 
of all parts of our United Kingdom 
are protected and advanced, so as we 
prepare for a new negotiation with the 
European Union we will fully involve the 
Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland 
Governments.’ On her first visit to 
Scotland after becoming Prime Minster 
on 15 July 2016, Theresa May said 
that:
‘I've been very clear with the 
first minister today that I want 
the Scottish government to be 
fully engaged in our discussion. I 
have already said that I won't be 
triggering Article 50 until I think 
that we have a UK approach and 
objectives for negotiations. I think it 
is important that we establish that 
before we trigger Article 50.’
In contrast to the inclusive approach, 
PM May has also repeatedly made clear 
that agreeing a UK-wide approach did 
not mean giving any of the regions a 
veto. The devolved legislatures would 
not be allowed to ‘block Brexit’. 
This appears particularly problematic 
with reference to Northern Ireland and 
Scotland, whose populations voted to 
remain in the EU.
The UKSC has now stepped into the 
breach by concluding that the consent 
of the devolved legislatures is not 
constitutionally necessary before official 
notice to withdraw from the EU is 
given under Art. 50 TEU. The question 
it had to address was whether any UK 
legislation that sought, for instance, to 
repeal the European Communities Act 
1972 would be subject to the Sewel 
Convention.
This question opens up a gulf between 
constitutional law and constitutional 
politics. The UK government will claim, 
correctly, that EU law falls within 
the jurisdiction of the Westminster 
Parliament. The devolution legislation 
in Scotland, Wales, and Northern 
Ireland assumes that the UK would be a 
member of the EU, but does not require 
the UK to remain a member. It follows 
that there can be no ‘parallel legislative 
competence’ by with the devolved 
legislatures could withdraw from the EU 
(Miller [129]).
However, the devolved administrations 
will point out equally correctly, that 
to g ive ef fec t  to EU withdrawal 
Westminster would have to relieve the 
devolved legislatures of their statutory 
obligation to respect EU law. This 
would require changing the devolution 
legislation. The NIA 1998 has been 
described as the ‘constitution’ for 
Northern Ireland. It involves a delicate 
three-way power sharing structure 
between the Republic of I reland, 
the devolved administrations and 
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The mythical Art.50 TEU gives Member States the option to 
withdraw from the EU ‘in accordance with its own constitutional 
requirements’. But what are the constitutional requirements of 
a country with no written constitution? And which institution 
is best placed to resolve the competing constitutional claims 
regarding prerogative powers, Acts of Parliament, conventions, and 
individual rights that were voiced by the government, the devolved 
administrations, and by the claimants?
legislatures, and the UK. Amending the 
NIA 1998 unilaterally would be especially 
reckless, if not actually impossible as 
a matter of international relations and 
practical politics.
As a matter of constitutional law, 
Westminster may of course repeal 
the European Communities Act 1972 
or amend the devolution legislation 
at any time. However, as a matter 
of  const i tut ional  po l i t ic s ,  the UK 
government will not normally invite 
Westminster to legislate on devolved 
matters or on the extent of devolved 
powers without first obtaining the 
consent of  the re levant devo lved 
legislature. That understanding stems 
from the Sewel Convention, which exists 
in two forms: first, as an uncodified 
constitutional convention for Northern 
I reland; second, in statutory form 
for Scotland and Wales. The Smith 
Commission was established in the 
aftermath of the Scottish Independence 
referendum of 2014. As part of the 
overall drive to create a stronger and 
more autonomous Scottish Parliament 
i t  proposed that  that  ‘ the Sewel 
Convention will be put on a statutory 
footing’. The Scotland Act 2016 inserted 
this recommendation into the 1998 Act1, 
and the Wales Act 2017 has now similarly 
amended the Government of Wales Act 
2006.2
 
Ultimately, the devolution question 
disguises a clash between law, the 
constitution, and politics. The UKSC is 
undoubtedly correct that the consent 
of the devolved legislatures is not 
legally required for the purposes of 
tr iggering Ar t.50 TEU – or for the 
purposes of amending the devolution 
legislation. However, so long as the 
Sewel Convention is in place, it is a 
constitutional requirement that the 
devolved assemblies pass a legislative 
1 S. 28(8) Scotland Act 1998, as amended 
by s.2(2) Scotland Act 2016. 
2 S.2 Wales Act 2017.
consent  mot ion under  the Sewel 
convention before those parts of the 
devolution legislation incorporating EU 
law can be amended. Politically, there 
is a danger that the UKSC’s retreat 
to constitutional formalism will be 
interpreted as constitutional intransigence 
in the regions. Withdrawing from the EU 
will certainly alter the general and special 
arrangements of the Northern Irish peace 
process. Moreover, the outcome of the 
Northern Ireland assembly elections in 
March 2017 throws down the gauntlet 
for the future of political power-sharing 
and joint government. The Miller decision 
allows the SNP to proclaim that the UK 
government’s promises to enhance the 
Sewel Convention are ‘not worth the 
paper they were written on’, and that 
Scotland cannot be an equal partner in 
the UK so long as its ‘voice is simply not 
being heard or listened to within the UK’. 
In conclusion, the UKSC adds to the 
government’s humiliation by turning the 
loss of individual rights into a loss of a 
domestic source of law. It then appears 
to throw the government some rope 
on the devolution question. On current 
evidence, however, it is unclear whether 
that rope is a lifeline or a noose. The 
single most important constitutional 
requirement for the UK lies in prioritising 
the Northern Irish and Scottish questions 
as a matter of urgency. Devolution 
happens to be intrinsically tied up with 
the UK’s membership of the EU. It is 
unfortunate that the British tradition 
steadfastly refuses to discuss politics 
through a constitutional matrix. That is 
an old habit that needs to fade quickly. 
Finding an answer to the devolution 
quest ion is not just indispensable 
to working out the legal process of 
withdrawal under Art.50 TEU. More 
than that, it is constitutionally important, 
politically urgent and, in relation to the 
long-term national interest, vital.
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